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By exploring lessons learned from Ethiopia and Finland, this article challenges two 
assumptions about online hate speech research. First, it challenges the assumption that 
the best way to understand controversial concepts such as online hate speech is to 
determine how closely they represent or mirror some underlying set of facts or state of 
affairs online or in social media. Second, it challenges the assumption that academic 
research should be seen as separate from the many controversies that surround online 
hate speech debates globally. In its place, the article proposes the theory of “commentary” 
as a comparative research framework aimed at explaining how the messy and complex 
world of online and social media practices is articulated as hate speech over other ways 
of imagining this growing problem in global digital media environments. 
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Debates around the migration crisis, the resurgence of far-right extremism in Europe and the United 
States, and online cultures of misogyny, xenophobia, and racism have once again highlighted the growing 
problem of online hate speech. The stakes could not be higher. Critics have accused hate speech on 
Facebook for “fueling murderous violence” against minorities in Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Naughton, 2018). 
Research in Germany has tentatively found that antirefugee rhetoric on social media has led to an increase 
in hate crimes offline (Müller & Schwarz, 2018). Social media companies and governments are under 
growing pressure to find new “solutions” to the toxification of online and social media conversations. In the 
first quarter of 2018 alone, Facebook removed two million pieces of “bad content” from its platform—much 
of which was done through new mechanisms of algorithmic filtering (Facebook, 2018). This, in turn, has led 
to civil rights organizations raising concerns about problems of transparency, bias, and accountability 
involved in the widespread removal of social media content without due process (Article 19 & Privacy 
International, 2018). How researchers understand online hate speech is arguably one of the most pressing 
issues facing the future of global digital media research. 
 
But how exactly do we define what online hate speech is? Moreover, what does this contested term 
imply across a diverse range of countries with often radically different media environments and sociopolitical 
contexts and histories? Underpinning these questions are a number of theoretical problems that are 
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notoriously difficult to pin down. How should such expressions of hatred, for instance, be differentiated from 
the abundance of other types of content produced online? Can this be best achieved through analyzing the 
surface features of the content produced, which could then be considered indexical of the deeper sentiments, 
affects, emotions, intentions, motivations, feelings, or attitudes of hatred “based upon the target’s being 
identified with a social or demographic group” (Gagliardone, Gal, Alves, & Martinez, 2015, p. 10)? Or should 
researchers instead rely on their implicit contextual knowledge and interpretation when determining what 
constitutes online hate speech (e.g., “I know it when I see it”)? Alternatively, how do such expressions of 
hatred relate to the broader discourse of violence around it? Can the physical or mental harm of online hate 
speech—discrimination, hostility, or violence—be identified from the content that is shared? Or should the 
different ways in which audiences interpret the meanings of these expressions of hatred also be factored in 
when assessing its importance? 
 
A body of scholarly work has begun to disentangle the difficult theoretical questions stirred up by 
this problem of online hate speech. Critical legal scholars have explored how hateful or otherwise violent 
speech relates to questions of freedom of expression (Hare & Weinstein, 2011; Herz & Molnar, 2012; 
Waldron, 2012). Political scientists have, in turn, analyzed the use of hateful language by extremist political 
movements (Brindle, 2016). Peace and conflict studies scholars have linked online hate speech debates to 
the dynamics of violent conflict (Buyse, 2014). Computer scientists have explored computational methods 
for identifying expressions of hatred from the abundance of “big data” found online and in the social media 
(see Burnap & Williams, 2015; Davidson, Warmsley, Macy, & Weber, 2017). 
 
In this article, however, I depart from these approaches to foreground a relatively understudied 
perspective to online hate speech debates. Rather than trying to define what constitutes online hate speech, 
or even what its cultural, political, and social consequences are, I ask instead, What does it mean to define 
something as online hate speech in the first place? I do this by exploring theoretically the different ways 
researchers negotiate—through their theoretical frameworks, methodological choices, and everyday 
research practices—the contested definitions and political controversies that are superimposed on this object 
of study. By doing this, the article challenges two assumptions about online hate speech research in a 
comparative global context. 
 
First, it challenges the assumption that the concepts researchers use, academic or otherwise, 
should be primarily seen as representing or mirroring some underlying reality, set of facts, or state of affairs. 
In its place, I argue that the concepts that researchers use must also function performatively; that is, they 
are used to enact different outcomes in the situations they are deployed in. From this perspective, how 
researchers define what online hate speech is cannot be limited only to what this concept ostensibly means, 
or its correspondence to some set of underlying practices found online or in the social media, but has to do 
as much with what the concept tries to achieve across a diverse range of situations. Second, it challenges 
the assumption that academic practice, especially when involving controversial concepts such as online hate 
speech, cannot be seen as separate from the social and political antagonisms that surround it. In its place, 
the article therefore advances a “bi-focal” or “doubly critical” (Pohjonen, 2014) research approach to the 
contradictory meanings that online hate speech is given in different global contexts. An integral part of this 
includes developing a critical ethnographic sensibility to the different practices of how the discourse of online 
hate speech itself is strategically deployed across a variety of political debates and, as important, how 
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researchers themselves are inextricably situated as participants in the sociopolitical assemblages that 
constitute these debates (Delanda, 2016). 
 
The argument proceeds in four parts. The first part examines the theoretical challenges involved 
in defining online hate speech from a comparative global perspective. The second part outlines an alternative 
theoretical framework for online hate speech research based on approaching it as a form of media 
commentary through which the messy world of everyday online and social media practices is given 
retroactive meaning and closure. The third part illustrates the argument by comparing two research projects 
on online hate speech in two distinctly different sociopolitical contexts and media environments: Ethiopia 
and Finland. The article concludes by making the case for the concept of “extreme speech” as an 
anthropological qualifier to online hate speech debates—a concept that was developed to allow more 
theoretical flexibility to research the specific cultural contexts and situated practices surrounding this 
phenomenon globally. 
 
How to Do Things With Online Hate Speech? 
 
The difficulty in defining what online hate speech is can be partially explained by the multiple 
overlapping discourses that operate on the concept. Brown (2017a, 2017b) argues that a critical distinction 
needs to be made between the use of hate speech as a legal concept and its use as an ordinary concept. By 
this, he means that the critical legal-philosophical debates that inspired the earlier important scholarly 
interventions into hate speech debates have now also spilled over to their “ordinary” uses. The exact theoretical 
terminology developed to explore the tenuous relationship between hateful speech and freedom of expression 
has been thus unwedded from its original purpose. Its use in public and political debates has less to do with 
legal elucidation or philosophical clarity and more to do with rhetorically advancing ideological viewpoints. 
Brown (2017a) writes, 
 
the term “hate speech” has been perhaps most often associated with liberal progressives, 
or people on the left of politics—who use it to highlight and problematize speech that they 
view as racist, xenophobic, homophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, disablist, or in some 
other way targeted at minority groups in ways that supposedly violate ideals of respect, 
solidarity, tolerance, and so forth. By contrast, many political and religious conservatives 
repudiate such uses of the term, and view them simply as crude attempts to close down 
meaningful debate on what they believe are the evils of open-border policies, the failures of 
multiculturalism as a social experiment, the lamentable decline of traditional moral values, 
political correctness gone mad, and so on. (p. 425) 
 
Global digital media researchers working with online hate speech therefore must negotiate its uses both in 
legal doctrine and criminal law, and in its more promiscuous appropriation for political rhetoric in public 
debates. This conceptual ambiguity has precipitated a number of satellite concepts, which have each tried to 
differentiate more narrowly defined subsets of online expressions of hatred. Benesch (2014), for instance, uses 
the concept of dangerous speech to highlight the risks of real-world violence and genocide associated with 
hateful speech acts in situations of violent conflict. Buyse (2014) talks about fear speech when focusing on the 
sociopsychological dynamics of fear-mongering associated with such expressions of hatred. Saleem, Dillon, 
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Benesch, and Ruths (2017) propose hateful speech as a conceptual shortcut for aiding computational detection 
of expressions of hatred from the abundance of other digital traces generated in online and social media 
conversations. Other terms, such as anti-social media, offensive speech, excitable speech, online vitriol, cyber-
bullying, micro-aggression, or inflammatory language, have also been widely used as metonymical substitutes 
for the concept of online hate speech as an effort to buffer the more normative legal conjunctions associated 
with it (Gagliardone, 2019). 
 
The concepts that researchers use are important because they influence the outcome of the research 
(e.g., what conceptual criteria the research framework needs to use to differentiate relevant expressions of 
hatred from all the other social media conversations “out there”) and how others engage with the research 
(e.g., despite its conceptual ambiguities, the term hate speech still carries more rhetorical value in public and 
political debates than other terms such as inflammatory language or offensive speech). Moreover, research 
has also shown that when working with contested concepts such as online hate speech, it is often difficult for 
researchers to reach intercoder agreement on how exactly to identify what types of speech acts should fall 
under this category. Kwok and Wang (2013) and Ross et al. (2016) have demonstrated how, even with the 
use of human annotators doing the categorization, what becomes classified as hate speech significantly 
depends on the backgrounds of the researchers doing the annotation, such as gender, ethnicity class, political 
orientation, and age. This process is also often complicated by the existence of coded linguistic forms such as 
jokes, innuendo, irony, metaphors, or double meanings associated with subcultural communities online. 
Identifying the subtle cultural nuances in the use of everyday language, therefore, requires significant levels 
of familiarity with the online cultures behind such expressions of hatred, which makes the generalization of 
speech categories across different cultural contexts problematic (Udupa, 2017). 
 
The difficulties involved in defining what online hate speech is, however, also highlight a more 
fundamental philosophical question than simply choosing the right conceptual framework or methodology for 
research (e.g., even using long-term ethnographic observation and sensitivity to the emic insights of online 
cultures will not solve all the challenges in defining online hate speech). This question has to do with whether 
controversial concepts such as online hate speech can ever have one determinable meaning that researchers 
should strive for, or should at least try to approximate, in their research frameworks. Contrary to this 
orthodoxy, for instance, Brown (2017b) argues that concepts such as hate speech should be instead 
approached through Wittgenstein’s theory of “family resemblance” concepts—that is, concepts that do not, or 
cannot, possess a singular or universal meaning outside their uses in different situations. He writes, 
 
What I am claiming, in other words, is not simply that a variety of different things can count 
as hate speech . . . I am claiming that the term “hate speech” has more than one meaning. 
Of course, it has become something of a cliché to assert that there is profound disagreement 
about the meaning of the term “hate speech,” disagreement not only among legal scholars 
and legal professionals but also among ordinary language users. But my claim is not that 
people disagree about what the correct definition of the term is; after all, that would be 
consistent with one of the definitions being correct and there actually being a single meaning. 
Instead, what I am claiming is that the term “hate speech” is systematically ambiguous; 
which is to say, it carries a multiplicity of different meanings. (p. 564) 
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This kind of antiessentialist view of language runs counter to the more commonsensical view of global digital 
media research according to which the utility of concepts is determined based on how accurately they are 
able to represent some underlying reality or state of affairs (e.g., the view that the definition of online hate 
speech should be understood based on how it reflects a set of activities found online). In this alternative 
view, however, the meaning of concepts needs to be also understood in their performative context. That is, 
rather than only being used in an effort to describe the messy world “somewhere out there,” they are also 
used strategically to enact specific outcomes and interventions in the situations in which they are deployed. 
Such a more pragmatic view of language use has many theoretical precedents from Wittgenstein’s “language 
games” (Wittgenstein, 2009), Austin’s (1962) “speech-act theory” (see also Butler, 1997, Hartley’s (1995) 
“intervention analysis,” the concept of “articulation” in the cultural studies (Slack, 1996), the concept of 
“actants” in actor-network theory (Latour, 2007), or even the theory of “order-words” in the works of 
Deleuze (1987). 
 
This complex debate around the philosophy of language is, of course, beyond the scope of this 
article (Deleuze, 1994; Rorty, 2017). Yet what this alternative approach to online hate speech debates 
implies is a shift in analytical register away from seeing online hate speech as a “transparent concept” that 
we can “glance through” or “a simple window to reality” (Boromisza-Habashi, 2013, p. 2), and toward a 
more nuanced appreciation of the situated everyday practices through which concepts are given their 
multiplicity of meanings. Unavoidably, these also include the practices of the researchers who work with 
online hate speech in their research. 
 
What I suggest in this article, therefore, is that if there are indeed no essential meanings behind 
the concept of online hate speech, one way that research can negotiate these differential meanings that 
online hate speech acquires in its different uses around the world is to develop a kind of doubly critical or 
bi-focal perspective toward these “different registers of truth in their articulation with each other” (Morley, 
2006, p. 32). As critical anthropologists have argued, the concepts that researchers use to explain the world 
should be seen also as “social facts,” facts that are inextricably linked to the sociocultural contexts of their 
production and the various shifting historical power relationships that have influenced how they circulate 
across a range of political, legal, and academic contexts (Rabinow, 1986). Instead of a transparent “mirror 
to reality,” what we find is a complex series of “cultural translations” through which researchers negotiate 
the conflictual and sometimes contradictory truth claims and worldviews of the participants involved in the 
research (Asad, 1986; Hobart, 1996). 
 
From this perspective, the analytical focus of online hate speech research shifts to a different 
ontological register: It becomes about the myriad practices through which the messy world of online 
practices and left-behind digital traces are represented as online hate speech over all other possible ways 
of imagining this growing problem of our global digitally mediated communication. 
 
Online Hate Speech as a Form of Media “Commentary”? 
 
One way to approach the ongoing debates on online hate speech is to see them as forms of media 
commentary. Hobart (2001) argues that media studies has historically faced the difficulty of theoretically 
pinning down its object of study. This is because the research has presupposed that there is something 
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substantial that underlies the media texts, production practices, or audience interpretations that the 
researcher is privy to interpret—whether this something is the “meaning” of the media text, the “culture” 
influencing the practices, the “ideology” of the audiences interpreting the media texts, or some other 
category that would preexist its mediation in academic, public, or political debates. Against these essentialist 
approaches, however, Hobart suggests that it makes more sense to approach media text and practices as 
underdetermined. This is to say, the multiplicity of sociopolitical assemblages that constitute global media 
today have always more meanings superimposed on them than any research account is able to capture. 
Moreover, because of this fundamental impossibility of providing closure to what in reality consists of an 
almost infinitely complex set of social, political, and cultural practices and histories, one key part of 
contemporary media practices and representations involves practices whose primary purpose is to comment 
on what the significance of these prior media practices is in the first place and how people should understand 
them. 
 
This concept of media “commentary” builds on Foucault’s analysis of the discursive mechanisms 
through which the production of knowledge is regulated in contemporary societies. Foucault (1981) wrote 
that “the commentary’s only role, whatever the technique used, is to say at last what was silently articulated 
‘beyond,’ in the text” (p. 57). Such commentaries, therefore, consist of the different discursive practices 
through which earlier texts (e.g., such as expressions of hatred found online on any given day) are given 
retroactive meaning despite there being no such singular meanings behind them to begin with (e.g., 
articulating the diverse range of hateful expressions of hatred online as hate speech over other ways of 
imagining the problem). Foucault argued that such 
 
commentary exorcises the chance element of discourse by giving it its due: it allows us to 
say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is this text itself which is 
said, and in a sense completed. The open multiplicity, the element of chance, are 
transferred, by the principle of commentary, from what might risk being said, on the 
number, the form, the mask, and the circumstance of the repetition. The new thing lies 
not in what is said but in the event of its return. (p. 58) 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, then, the purpose of such media commentaries is not found only in what these 
commentaries say or mean, but also in their attempt to provide retroactive closure to the overflow of 
meaning that characterizes the messy world of social and cultural practices through the endless of repetition 
of commentaries about what the “real” meaning of the phenomena under consideration is or how it should 
be understood. 
 
In other words, then, from the perspective of this kind of antiessentialist approach to online hate 
speech debates, such commentaries consist of those moments in which the meaning of online hate speech 
itself is debated and contested in different situations globally and thus given its significance. Moreover, 
what is relevant about such media commentaries is that many of them take place in the digital media 
itself. Approaching online hate speech as a form of media commentary, therefore, can open up a new 
empirical object of study for researchers interested in empirically researching debates on online hate 
speech. That is, instead of starting the research from the Sisyphean task of trying to provide a definition 
for online hate speech, research can instead step back from the politicized debates and controversy—
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even if strategically and temporarily—and foreground a more critical sensibility toward the everyday 
practices through which such political meanings are produced and contested in global digital media 
commentaries. 
 
My interest in this kind of critical meta-methodological perspective to the global discourse of online 
hate speech, and the academic research thereof, derives from research projects in which I have been 
involved in Ethiopia and Finland. The next section specifies the theoretical argument by illustrating its key 
points through comparing online hate speech research across these two distinctly different sociopolitical 
contexts and media environments. 
 
Researching Online Hate Speech in Ethiopia 
 
Despite rhetoric about its importance as a forum for political participation, Internet accessibility 
levels in Ethiopia remain some of the lowest in the world. Ethiopia has maintained (at least until recently) 
one of the most extensive systems of online censorship and surveillance in Africa, and its government has 
routinely arrested journalists and bloggers for expressing critical voices online. Within this context, the 
discourse of online hate speech in Ethiopia has been linked to the political antagonisms in the country and 
invoked by both the government and the opposition to express a panoply of other grievances (Gagliardone, 
2017; Legesse, 2012). Two examples illustrate how contested the meaning of online hate speech was in 
Ethiopia during the time of our research. 
 
When we posted an advertisement online looking for research assistants, Tigray Online—an online 
news site considered by many to be associated with the government—published an article titled “Oxford 
University Wants to Study Ethiopian Election Time Propaganda and Online Debates, but Why?” The writer 
of the article expressed concerns about what the political motives of online hate speech research in the 
Ethiopia context were: 
 
I cannot help but feel why spend all this money to identify and understand Ethiopian hate 
speech online. . . . This move can enable foreign forces, especially those who have been 
working extra hours to incite color revolution in Ethiopia, join the online hate speeches we 
are not so proud of ourselves and guide them into directions we as Ethiopians would not 
like them to go. No matter how far apart and antagonistic our political stands are, we all 
know better than inviting foreigners to come and mess things up even further. (Gebru, 
2014, paras. 5–6, emphasis added) 
 
The online article further commented on how this research should be positioned into the longer history of 
“foreign forces” working to destabilize the government by unfairly highlighting the political tensions in the 
country. The author of the article also cited an earlier report we had published, which had identified some 
of the challenges involved in researching online hate speech in such politically polarized countries. In the 
report, we had suggested that one of the aims of online hate speech research should be to provide a “neutral 
platform for mediation through which the antagonisms underpinning hate speech could be better identified 
and steps be taken to mitigate them” (Gagliardone, Pohjonen, & Patel, 2014, p. 37). The author of the 
Tigray Online article, however, argued that, even with the best intentions of providing such a neutral 
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platform, the study would nonetheless have negative effects in Ethiopia because it would get “used by forces 
that would like to incite violence in the country” (Gebru, 2014, para. 11). 
 
Conversely, following an interview about our research results in a diasporic Ethiopian online news 
site, an article titled “Ethiopia: Is University of Oxford Cooking a Study?” was published in ECAFD Online, a 
news forum associated with the Ethiopian and diasporic opposition. The article accused the research of 
selling out to the government: 
 
From all countries to pick Apartheid Ethiopia with the lowest internet penetration 
controlled by TPLF1 intelligence agency that as a policy promote hate and violence among 
Ethiopians is a tragedy by its own. (Debalke, 2016, para. 17, emphasis added) 
 
The article, which was shared 351 times, further argued that the primary purpose of the research 
was to serve the interests of the Ethiopian regime. 
 
These two examples illustrate how overdetermined the meaning of online hate speech was in 
Ethiopia during the time of our research. From the government’s side, research on online hate speech was 
linked to the history with foreign forces to destabilize the country. On the opposition side, researchers were 
accused of working for the same government. Publicly summoning the term online hate speech thus brought 
into ambit all kinds of diametrically opposed commentaries about its significance that had little to do with 
the intentions or motivations of our original research. Regardless of what the research framework was, or 
even what its results showed, the research was clawed back into the preexisting political grievances in 
Ethiopia and the broader history of political struggle and conflict in the country. 
 
It was within this context that we had to negotiate the many contested meanings given to online 
hate speech in Ethiopia while conducting our research. One way to do this was to host workshops where the 
significance of online hate speech itself could be debated among participants from different political 
orientations—each with radically different ideas of what online hate speech meant in the Ethiopian context, 
what should be done about it, and, especially, who was to blame for it. What started out as an exploratory 
research project into an understudied topic quickly became associated with a host of other meanings—
meanings that had little to do with how this object of study is commonly understood in Western debates. 
By strategically leaving the definition of online hate speech as open as possible, online hate speech was thus 
commented on and understood by the workshop participants to be as much a manifestation of the underlying 
social and political conflict in Ethiopia as it was about determining what types of speech acts should be 
excluded from the legitimate space of political expression and who was to blame for it. 
 
In our follow-up project in Ethiopia, we tried to incorporate these antagonistic meanings into its 
research framework. This was done through a number of deliberate theoretical and methodological 
interventions. First, we developed a sampling strategy, trying to contextualize the politically charged debates 
on online hate speech by situating them within the broader communicative milieu and cultures of 
communication of Ethiopian and diasporic online spaces that went beyond a simplistic binary understanding 
                                               
1 TPLF refers to the Tigrinya People’s Liberation Front, one of the dominant political groups in Ethiopia. 
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of hate speech/not hate speech. Rather than focusing only on statements categorized as online hate speech, 
the research resulted in the creation of a sample frame composed of more than 1,000 Facebook pages that 
reflected a diversity of popular Ethiopian and diasporic online conversations. Second, the conceptual 
framework used in the research purposefully moved away from the legal-normative approaches to hate 
speech to foreground the different types of communicative relationships that form in online conversations. 
This was done through conceptually categorizing statements based on whether they facilitated (going 
toward) or hindered (going against) dialogue and engagement among the interlocutors involved. Statements 
that went against thus included statements with “conflict-producing” or “conflict maintaining behavior,” such 
as “attacking another speaker or a specific group by belittling, challenging, provoking, teasing them 
maliciously, or explicitly threatening them” (Gagliardone et al., 2016, p. 17). Statements that went toward, 
on the contrary, included statements that tried to build communicative relationships through “acknowledging 
another person or group’s position, offering additional information about the topic being discussed, joking 
(in a non-hostile teasing way), and creating engagement and conversation with the other members in the 
discussion” (p. 17). 
 
This kind of pragmatic approach to the definition of online hate speech was aimed as much toward 
promoting cross-political dialogue as it was about taking sides or blaming any of the parties involved. It also 
allowed the research to produce new empirical insights into the nature of online conversations in Ethiopia. 
Using this research framework, we analyzed more than 13,000 messages from this sample frame over a 
four-month period (see Gagliardone et al., 2016, pp. 12‒22). What was surprising about approaching 
debates on online hate speech from this perspective was that social media conversations in Ethiopia, in 
addition to containing traces of the ethnic and political conflict in the country, also seemed to also promote 
spaces for constructive political engagement. Although the worst kinds of hate speech or dangerous speech 
were still found, they were uttered by people who were anonymous or had little influence. More crucially, 
the research also found no hateful speech acts in which the speakers had the actual means to carry out the 
threat of violence in real-world situations. While the findings of the research were, of course, particular to 
the research questions posed, the methodology used, and the idiosyncratic political situation in Ethiopia at 
the time of research, approaching online hate speech from such a holistic communicational perspective took 
away some of the rhetorical power of the government’s argument for further censoring social media 
conversations in Ethiopia as a means to prevent its imagined dangers. 
 
Researching Online Hate Speech in Finland 
 
What is curious when approaching online hate speech from such a comparative perspective (e.g., 
how the lessons learned in one context can be applied to a different context) is how differently debates are 
discursively framed depending on the part of the world that is the focus of the research (Jackson, 2012). 
With the risk of caricaturing or simplifying what in reality consists of a range of different and often 
incommensurable theoretical positions, when the question is about online hate speech in the West, the 
problem seems to be framed more in terms of a “discourse of pathology” that divides the social world into 
a mainstream center and an extremist periphery. From this perspective, the problem of online hate speech 
becomes more about identifying where the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable speech is drawn 
and who should be excluded from the legitimate sphere of political expression. However, when the debates 
focus outside the liberal West, and in countries such as Ethiopia, the problem of online hate speech is often 
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framed more from the perspective of ethnic or political conflict and its mediation. The underlying metaphor 
here, in contrast, divides the social world into two (or more) parallel sides involved in a conflict situation 
and a shifting zone of engagement through which peaceful solutions to the conflict could be found, and 
perhaps pockets of “spoilers” who are left out of the peace process because they are not willing to enter a 
peaceful solution or actively try to provoke violence to derail solutions to conflict (Stedman, 1997). 
 
The problem of online hate speech, therefore, becomes as much about finding ways to mitigate the 
social and political tensions underlying such expressions of hatred as it is about determining what kinds of 
speech acts are acceptable and what is not—as perhaps has been more common in the historical genealogy 
of hate speech debates in the West revolving around questions of freedom of speech. 
 
In my second research project, I thus aimed to explore how these lessons learned in Ethiopia could 
apply to the European context during the so-called 2015‒2016 migrant/refugee crisis, and to Finland in 
particular. What was surprising about approaching social media conversation this way was how prolific 
hateful and violent expressions against immigrants had become during the migrant/refugee crisis. All the 
characteristics of the worst kinds of hate speech we had previously identified in situations of violent ethnic 
and political conflict—comparing people to animals or vermin, explicit calls to violence and accusations in a 
mirror—could be found in abundance in Finnish social media and online spaces. 
 
This raised an interesting theoretical dilemma that I wanted to explore in my research. Indeed, if 
such expressions of hatred in what has often been considered the “safest country in the world” had become 
more abundant, aggressive, and violent than what our research had found in Ethiopia, a country with a long 
history of ethnic and political conflict and violence, how should we best theoretically approach this nebulous 
relationship between online speech and the discourse of violence surrounding it? Said differently, how should 
we understand online hate speech in a situation in which the tenuous relationship between online speech 
and the discourse of violence seemed to follow a kind of counterintuitive logic? That is, there were more 
expressions of hatred online in a country that was, at least on the surface, more peaceful, at least in terms 
of fewer outbreaks of violence. What kind of comparative research frameworks and operational definitions 
of hate speech would, then, take into count this somewhat counterintuitive logic? 
 
During the so-called migrant/refugee crisis in 2015–2016, debates on hate speech in Finland had 
become polarized between the anti-immigrant and the antiracist groups, each holding diametrically opposed 
viewpoints on the question of the arriving refugees. On the one side of the political spectrum was the popular 
Rajat Kiinni (Close the Borders) Facebook group, which had become a notorious for its antirefugee 
sentiments and hateful tone of conversation. On the opposing side, the Rasmus group (Finland´s national 
network and association working against racism and xenophobia and promoting equity and human rights) 
had adopted an explicitly antiracist position. A big part of the interaction among these opposed groups 
consisted of promoting screenshots accusing each other of promoting hate speech or defending against 
these accusations. 
 
Given this context of social media polarization in Finland, again, instead of trying to define what 
was meant by these ongoing accusations of hate speech in these debates a priori, in my research, I decided 
to instead explore how the concepts related to debates on hate speech themselves were given often 
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conflictual meaning by the participants involved in the debates. What was interesting about approaching the 
debates on online hate speech in Finland this way was how antagonistically the key terms associated with 
the migrant/refugee crisis were commented on in these conversations. For instance, words closely 
associated with the term pakolainen (refugee) in the antirefugee/immigration Facebook group Rajat Kiinni 
included a host of negative connotations, such as “parasite” or “welfare refugee.” On the contrary, in the 
antiracist group Rasmus, this term was more closely associated with words connoting forced movement and 
the need to help. 
 
Crucially, when the research explored what words were associated with vihapuhe (hate speech) 
itself in the two opposed groups, this term was defined and also understood in radically different ways. In 
the antiracist group Rasmus, vihapuhe was closely associated with terms such as violence, xenophobia, 
discrimination, and zero tolerance. On the contrary, in the anti-immigration/refugee Facebook group Rajat 
Kiinni, vihapuhe was closely associated with terms connoting the expression of opinions and of being accused 
and judged. These findings were based on computational text mining of word associations across close to 
500,000 comments found in these two groups and confirmed by a longer term digital ethnographic 
observation of the types of posts and comments found in these different groups. When members of the 
antiracist Rasmus group referred to debates on online hate speech, usually they did so in line with a more 
mainstream criticism of racist speech, fascism, and the rise of the anti-immigration far right. Conversely, 
when members of the antimigrant/refugee group Rajat Kiinni referred to debates on online hate speech, 
this was framed more as an attempt by the mainstream or the liberals to censor their opinions or hide the 
“real truth” about immigration (Pohjonen, 2018). 
 
One conclusion that I was able to draw from this comparative experiment was that even the key 
concepts, including the definition of hate speech itself, are understood in radically different ways by the 
participants involved. While in no way condoning the vitriolic expressions of hatred abundantly found in anti-
immigration groups in Finland or the emotional harm they can cause, I concluded that these definitions need 
to be incorporated into the research framework to attain a better understanding of the social and political 
antagonisms that generate such expressions of hate in the first place, and even what the grievances or the 
jouissance and “fun” driving these conversations are (Udupa, 2019). In taking such a bi-focal or doubly 
critical approach to online hate speech debates, one must, therefore, remain both critical of what is being 
expressed in these vitriolic debates and acknowledge that there are often radically different truth-claims by 
the participants involved; this must always be negotiated while conducting research, even in relatively 
homogenous societies like in Finland. 
 
Discussion 
 
What, then, can these two different research experiments tell us more broadly about such 
comparative approaches to online hate speech? As the examples from Ethiopia and Finland suggest, 
underlying online hate speech debates is a complex panoply of different sociopolitical dynamics, conflictual 
dynamics, and histories that risk being obviated by the more common legal-normative understandings of 
online hate speech. In both examples, through leaving the definition of online hate speech as open-ended 
as possible, in my research I instead chose to use it as a kind of “empty signifier” through which alternative 
viewpoints could be raised in these emotionally charged and overdetermined political debates (Laclau & 
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Mouffe, 1985). In Ethiopia, the aim of this was more to foreground questions of political participation and 
engagement evoked by debates on hate speech. In the case of Finland, the aim was to move the research 
framework beyond a common legal-normative definition of online hate speech to instead explore the 
sociopolitical tensions, conflictual dynamics, and contested meanings that underpinned such eruptions of 
hatred online during the migrant/refugee crisis in a relatively peaceful country with fewer instances of 
outbreaks of mass offline violence. 
 
Approaching online hate speech debates from such a bi-focal or doubly critical perspective does 
not, of course, mean that all media commentaries or definitions of online hate speech should be given moral 
equivalence, nor should the viewpoints of the targets of this speech or the harm caused by it be dismissed 
from the accounts. On the contrary, as is the case with any other political debate, there are always complex 
questions of power and practices of exclusion involved in how such media commentaries around online hate 
speech are produced and who benefits and suffers from them. In the case of Ethiopia, these power 
imbalances were linked to the post-civil war history of the country and the grievances raised against the 
ruling government. In the case of Finland, there are also unequal power relations involved in how online 
hate speech is articulated by immigrants, organized racist groups, academic researchers, the police, and 
legislative bodies. Rather, what this comparative research framework suggests is that these commentaries, 
and their rightful criticism, must always be situated within these sociopolitical assemblages where they are 
inextricably embedded to both better understand what the stakes are and find better ways to counter them. 
 
In conclusion, then, what I have argued in this article is that such a comparative approach to online 
hate speech debates has two potential implications for online hate speech research more broadly. First, 
approaching online hate speech debates as a form of media commentary potentially allows the research to 
empirically focus on the situations in which these differential meanings associated with this concept of online 
hate speech are produced, contested, and re-produced globally today and how these meanings are culturally 
translated and transmuted across different contexts and situations. The question here thus becomes less 
about what online hate speech is and more about why and where something is represented as online hate 
speech in the first place over other possible ways of imagining this growing problem of contemporary global 
digital media environments. The second implication derives from the first. It has to with the question of why 
researchers choose the specific concepts they use in their research in the first place, especially when dealing 
with contested topics such as online hate speech that arguably have no singular way to be represented. 
That is to say, if there are no essential meanings behind concepts to begin with, how researchers use these 
concepts also must be understood in their performative contexts, through the strategic goals that the use 
of these concepts is enacted to achieve in research situations and contexts that are unavoidably linked to 
the complex political contexts around them. 
 
The concept of extreme speech advanced in this Special Issue was developed as an anthropological 
qualifier to global debates on online hate speech, with the strategic goal of allowing researchers to better take 
into account the situated practices and cultural contexts behind the many different kinds of hateful online 
speech cultures that exist globally and the people behind them. Approaching online hate speech debates as 
form of media commentary thus builds on this research agenda to also foreground and highlight the different 
ways in which the multiplicity of online hate speech debates, and the many controversies around them, are 
given their significance globally and for what kinds of purposes. 
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